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_____________________________________ 
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District of Delaware 
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District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
_____________________________________ 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
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O P I N I O N* 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Vincent Tirpak, a former employee of the Delaware Department of Technology 
and Information (“DTI”), appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to DTI 
and the following DTI employees: James H. Sills, III, Michael J. Myron, Li Wen Lin, 
Matthew Payne, and Kim Thornton (“DTI employee-defendants”). Tirpak claimed that 
these defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). We will affirm the District Court’s ruling.1 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts of this 
case, we set forth only a brief summary here. Tirpak, who suffers from attention deficit 
disorder and depression, started working for DTI in 2006 as a Project Management 
Specialist. From January 24, 2011, to February 2, 2011, he took leave from DTI under the 
FMLA. Just over a month after he returned, DTI placed him on a Performance 
Improvement Plan (“PIP”). Over five months later, on August 18, 2011, DTI terminated 
his employment, citing his inability to meet the expectations outlined in the PIP.   
 On March 1, 2013, Tirpak filed this lawsuit. He alleged that the DTI employee-
defendants violated his procedural due process rights in terminating him (Count I). On 
appeal, however, he has conceded that the District Court properly rejected this claim. He 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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also alleged that DTI itself discriminated against him because of his disability and denied 
him reasonable accommodations in violation of the ADA (Counts 2 and 3), and that it 
retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave (Count 4). 
 The defendants moved for summary judgment. DTI argued that Tirpak’s ADA and 
FMLA claims against it were barred because it was a state agency and was thus immune 
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. In response, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123 (1908), Tirpak argued that these claims were permitted under the Eleventh 
Amendment because they sought injunctive relief and were against not DTI but rather the 
DTI employee-defendants. See Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[A] person seeking purely prospective relief against state officials for ongoing 
violations of federal law may sue under the ‘legal fiction’ of Ex parte Young . . . .”). 
 In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the District Court first concluded 
that the Eleventh Amendment barred Tirpak’s ADA and FMLA claims insofar as those 
claims were against DTI itself. DTI enjoys sovereign immunity unless it has consented to 
the suit or Congress has abrogated its immunity for the claim at issue. Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). As the District Court determined, 
neither exception applied to these claims. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity for claims asserted under Title I of the ADA); Coleman v. Court of 
Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1338 (2012) (holding that Congress lacked authority to 
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity for claims relating to FMLA’s self-care provision).  
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 The District Court then rejected Tirpak’s Ex parte Young argument, concluding 
that he had failed in several ways to properly plead his ADA and FMLA claims against 
the DTI employee-defendants. It pointed out that Tirpak pleaded these claims only 
“against Defendant Department of Technology and Information” and that, by contrast, he 
pleaded his procedural due process claim against the DTI employee-defendants. (App. 7.) 
It also highlighted how, in pleading the ADA and FMLA claims, Tirpak named DTI as 
the singular “Defendant.” (Id.) It also concluded that, even if Tirpak had pleaded these 
claims against the DTI employee-defendants and not just DTI itself, he still failed to 
plead plausible ADA and FMLA claims against them because he specified in his 
complaint that he was suing them each “individually” rather than in their official 
capacity. See Koslow, 302 F.3d at 178 (allowing ADA claim against a state official, “but 
only in his representative—not his individual—capacity”); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 
703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that Eleventh Amendment does not bar FMLA 
claim for prospective relief against “state officials in their official capacity”). The District 
Court then declined to allow Tirpak to amend his complaint to cure these defects, noting 
that he had never requested leave to amend his complaint. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. 
Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2007) (establishing that 
district courts must sua sponte grant plaintiffs leave to amend only in civil rights cases).  
 We find the District Court’s analysis to be correct in all respects and will therefore 
affirm its grant of summary judgment to DTI and the DTI employee-defendants.          
